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This paper presents a review of the most significant fiscal rules policymakers can choose 
from. The insights from this review are then applied to the current budgetary situation of the 
European Union. In the European Union, the supranational Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
should provide the necessary guidance in limiting governmental borrowing by member states. 
In addition to the SGP, European countries are implementing various other fiscal rules that 
bind central, regional and local governments. We provide empirical estimates of the effect of 
fiscal rules on fiscal balance, government spending and government revenues, using a Fiscal 
Rule Index. We find that fiscal rules have some effect on fiscal balances. 
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1  Introduction 
In recent decades, oil crises and ensuing recessions, high interest rates, political instability, an 
over-sized welfare state and structural problems contributed to the deterioration of public 
finances worldwide. Due to the current economic downturn, budgetary problems are on the 
agenda once again. The fiscal deficits incurred as a result of the current economic downturn 
cause the public debt to rise steeply. Yet, in comparison to other industrial countries, the 
public debt of some EU countries was already at a high level. For instance, public finances 
become susceptible to interest rate fluctuations as a consequence of a high public debt. In 
addition, as interest rates increase, advantageous government programs may be postponed, a 
debt trap may arise, and crowding out may reduce private investments. Moreover, the rates of 
interest may increase due to the growing risk aversion and the emergence of risk premia on 
sovereign  debt  as  e.g.  the  recent  case  of  the  Greek  and  Irish  debt  crisis  illustrates. 
Furthermore, private saving may be encouraged in the absence of the Ricardian equivalence, 
hampering economic recovery.
1  
  In the literature a consensus exists on the necessity of fiscal measures both in the 
short-run and long-run, to safeguard the stability of public finances which should at the same 
time  not  hamper  economic  recovery.  Therefore,  a  sufficiently  stringent  fiscal  policy  is 
appropriate to avert lapses like those in the mid-1970s and 1980s.   
Fiscal rules, whether quantitative or not, indicate the direction in which policymakers 
aim the public finances to evolve and the public sector's role in macroeconomic processes. 
The design of efficient and effective fiscal rules has been the centre of economic debate for 
several decades and rules with different aims and impacts have been suggested. Fiscal rules 
seek to provide a solution to the deficit bias problem that is caused by the governments’ short-
sightedness and the common pool problem.
2  
  A fundamental question concerns the need for an adequate framework of fiscal rules. 
We  divide  fiscal  rules  in  two  categories:  (i)  fiscal  rules  that  primarily  aim  at  restricting 
deficits and debt to guarantee fiscal sustainability. The fiscal rules inspired by (neo)- classical 
principles  fall  into  this  category.  (ii)  Fiscal  rules  that  primarily  aim  at  stabilizing 
macroeconomic fluctuations. These rules are guided by (new)- Keynesian principles of fiscal 
management. 
  The objective of this paper is to present a review of the most significant fiscal rules 
that have been applied and proposed in the past to give a comprehensive overview of all the 
basic  alternatives  policymakers  can  choose  from.  The  insights  from  this  review  are  then 
applied to the current European Union. In the European Union, the supranational Stability and 
Growth  Pact  (SGP)  should  provide  the  necessary  guidance  in  limiting  governmental 
borrowing by member states. In addition to the SGP, European countries are implementing 
various other fiscal rules that bind central, regional and local governments. We provide some 
empirical estimates of the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal balances, government spending and 
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government  revenues,  using  a  recently  compiled  Fiscal  Rule  Index  by  the  European 
Commission. We find that fiscal rules have some effect on fiscal balances. 
  The policy contribution of this paper is to provide policymakers with the main insights 
from the literature on fiscal rules and recent issues relating to fiscal rules in the EU. This will 
be helpful when designing further changes in the fiscal framework. For that reason, not only 
the mechanisms will be set forth, but also the various strengths and shortcomings will be 
recapitulated. Furthermore, a general framework for future budgetary actions is presented, as 
well as for the future European fiscal policy. In particular, a solution for a more effective 
European fiscal policy is presented. 
  This paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present an overview of the most 
significant  fiscal  rules,  as  well  as  their  limitations.  Section  4  discusses  the  setup  of  the 
Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  its  interaction  with  numerous  domestic  fiscal  rules  and 
considerations for its reform. Section 5 documents new empirical evidence on the effects of 
fiscal rules on budgetary stances in the Euro Area. 
 
2  Fiscal Rules and sustainability of public finance: Classical principles 
2.1  Classical Economics: Balanced Budget and Golden Rule 
(Neo)-  classical  economics  assumes  that  no  policy  impulses  are  necessary  to  increase 
production and employment -as these would represent efficient market outcomes- and propose 
that policymakers pursue best a balanced budget strategy. All government expenditures are 
seen  as  consumptive  and  to  be  financed  by  tax  proceeds  approved  by  the  parliament. 
Financing  such  consumptive  expenditures  with  public  debt  would  crowd  out  private 
investments due to increasing rates of interest. Monetary financing would have an inflationary 
effect. Although the balanced budget rule is still widely used, it has to be taken into account 
that a balanced budget not necessarily has a neutral impact on the economy, as shown by the 
balanced budget multiplier theorem.
3 In addition, a budget balance does not only result from 
discretionary policy, but is also affected by automatic stabilizers and expectations. 
  Revenues  would  also  have  to  be  tailored  to  needs;  a  discretionary  (possibly 
countercyclical) revenue policy to avoid any budget deficit or surplus is, however, not self-
evident. For that reason, the Golden Rule seems more advisable. In this case, neoclassical 
economists  argue  that  it  is  allowed  to  use  private  savings  to  finance  productive  public 
investments, because these investments would recover their costs in the long run. As a result, 
a  stabilizing  policy  is  possible  by  means  of  productive  investments  and  a  country's  (net) 
public debt would remain constant in the long-term. 
  Nevertheless, the Golden Rule has not been without criticism either. Firstly, it is not 
always  clear  which  discount  rate  has  to  be  used  to  determine  whether  investments  are 
productive or not. A private discount rate that orientates on market interest rates or a lower 
social  discount  rate  of  a  farsighted  government  that  is  able  to  implement  future-oriented 
policies. It has also been argued that substantial public investment programs can influence the 
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long-term  rate  of  interest.
4  Secondly,  research  shows  that,  although  the  Golden  Rule 
stimulates economic growth in the short run, this does not necessarily imply increased growth 
rates  in  the  long  run.
5  Thirdly,  the  distinction  between  consumptive  and  investment 
expenditures is not always clear. For instance, disagreement exists concerning the expenditure 
for education. In addition, many useful investment projects will not recover their costs unless 
the full social benefits are taken into account. Finally, inflation also has to be taken into 
consideration. Since inflation diminishes the debt burden, a higher budget deficit would be in 
accordance with the golden rule in case of inflation. Therefore, it is the inflation adjusted 
budget deficit that cannot exceed public investments.
6 In spite of all these shortcomings, the 
Golden Rule is still applied in the United Kingdom and Germany.
7 
  Fiscal rules that are designed using (neo)-classical principles, concentrate on securing 
solvency of the government. The intertemporal budget constraint is inspired by the net present 
value concept and assesses whether the government will be able to bear the future burden of 
public  debt.  In  other  words,  it  assesses  whether  the  future  primary  balances  will  be 
sufficiently large to repay the outstanding public debt. Mathematically, this can be expressed 
as follows, 




































where  S equals the stock of public debt at period t, 
P G , government expenditures excluding 
the interest burden, T, government revenues and i is the long-term rate of interest. Using this 
expression,  policymakers  can  determine  the  most  appropriate  fiscal  policy  to  equate  both 
sides. The budget is said to be intertemporally sustainable if the current public debt equals the 
net present value of future primary balances. Consequently, the second term of the right-hand 
side of the above-mentioned equation will approach zero, i.e. all debt will be redeemed.
    In  addition  to  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint,  a  country's  fiscal  gap  can  be 
determined. The fiscal gap reflects the net present value of future government expenditures, 
including servicing public debt, and future revenues. In fact, it is a measure of the additional 
burden that will need to be imposed on future generations to satisfy the intertemporal budget 
constraint.
8  Given  the  ageing  population  and  the  corresponding  costs,  this  is  seen  as  an 
important indicator of the sustainability of a country's public finances by the advocates of 
generational accounting. 
  Note that a systematically increasing public debt as a percentage of GDP can still be 
considered intertemporally sustainable as long as the primary deficit does react to the level of 
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debt. The total budget deficit on the other hand may be held constant. Yet, this reasoning does 
not allow for the adverse consequences of a high public debt mentioned earlier. Also, the 
determination of the future rates of interest is not free of problems either. The choice may be 
arbitrary and, moreover, time-consuming as it has to be repeated for each respective time 
period  in  order  to  discount  fluctuations  correctly.  Furthermore,  the  assumption  that  a 
country’s public debt will be redeemed completely is unrealistic and the optimal level of 
public debt does not necessarily have to be zero. 
 
2.2  Avoiding the debt trap 
The (public) debt trap has scourged public finances in many European countries in the past. 
Therefore, avoiding the dept trap is seen as a standard for fiscal policy. The debt trap can be 
defined as a vicious circle in which an initial budget deficit has to be funded by public debt, 
which  in  turn  increases  a  country's  interest  burden  and  consequently  its  deficit,  and  thus 
further increases public debt. A halt to the rise of public debt is needed to break this circle and 
mitigate  the  accompanying  consequences  of  a  high  public  debt.  In  order  to  realize  that, 
policymakers need to understand the dynamics of public debt. Public debt can be expressed as 
in 
1 ) 1 ( − + + = t
p
t t S i D S   (2) 
where 
p D  is the primary deficit and  1 ) 1 ( − + t S i  comprises a country's interest burden during 
period  t.  Equation  (2)  can  be  rewritten  as  an  expression  of  the  change  in  the  debt  as  a 
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where  s  is the ratio of a country's public debt to GDP, g is the growth rate of GDP, and 
p d  is 
the primary deficit as a percentage of GDP. Three scenarios are conceivable. First, the public 
debt as a percentage of GDP will increase if the interest due on current debt exceeds nominal 
GDP growth (i>g), unless a substantial primary surplus counterbalances the deterioration. 
Nevertheless,  a  primary  deficit  will  deteriorate  a  country's  position  further  as  debt  rises 
exponentially.  Secondly,  the  debt  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  will  decrease  if  nominal  GDP 
growth exceeds the long-term rate of interest (i>g), unless the primary deficit is large enough 
to compensate the decrease. Third, policymakers can stabilize the level of public debt and 
concentrate on breaking the vicious circle. For instance, when GDP growth does not surpass 
the rate of interest public debt can be stabilized at s percent of GDP in the medium-term if the 
following primary surplus is realized, i.e. a sufficient proportion of the interest burden is 
covered by tax proceeds: 















= −  
(4) 
As a result, the debt trap can be stopped depending on three parameters: the primary budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP, the average rate of interest due on public debt, and the 
nominal GDP growth rate.   6 
  This approach is useful to evaluate severe circumstances, i.e. when the rate of interest 
is high, nominal GDP growth is low and public debt is already at a high level relative to GDP. 
Otherwise, there is only a limited precautionary effect. Furthermore, as economic growth and 
the  rate  of  interest  are  not  straightforward  to  influence,  the  primary  balance  is  the  only 
parameter useful to policymakers. In addition, the approach does not take into account the 
economic consequences of government expenditures and tax revenues, which are the primary 
policy instruments. Therefore, the approach only strives for a stable position by means of the 
minimal required measures instead of defining an optimum. Possible structural problems that 
may be at the base of the budgetary problems are overlooked. In a similar vein, the burden for 
future  generations  is  ignored  by  the  model.  Finally,  politicians  may  hamper  an  effective 
application of the rule as they prefer a higher target level of public debt because that would 
allow them to run a lower primary budget balance. 
 
3  Fiscal Rules and macroeconomic stabilization: (new-) Keynesian principles 
3.1  Keynesian Deficit Spending 
In  the  1930s  the  Great  Depression  brought  about  a  shift  in  economic  thought.  As 
Keynesianism won ground, cyclical expenses and revenues on top of a balanced budget were 
no longer seen as unacceptable. Such automatic stabilizers were deemed desirable in times of 
recession when a countercyclical policy is preferred to a balanced budget. This would be 
necessary as market mechanisms are assumed not to be sufficient to restore full employment.
9 
Budgetary stabilization policy consists not only of automatic stabilizers, like progressive tax 
rates  and  unemployment  benefits,  but  also  of  discretionary  interventions.  More  explicit 
measures (e.g. the full employment budget balance) were designed to make a clear distinction 
between those expenses that are cyclically justifiable and those of discretionary nature. 
  In  spite  of  the  potential  benefits  of  budgetary  stabilization  policy,  the  Keynesian 
policy  principles  have  displayed  some  shortcomings  in  the  past.  For  example,  during  the 
1980s  policymakers  in  many  European  countries  underestimated  future  debt  problems. 
Moreover,  asymmetric  applications  were  often  observed.  During  economic  downturns  a 
stabilization policy was applied by raising expenditures and cutting taxes. In case of booms 
the policy would, however, require cutting expenditures and raising taxes. Politically, this was 
very difficult to maintain. Besides, downturns were often misused by politicians to fund more 
expenditures  than  necessary.  The  resulting  deficit  bias  implies  that  eventually  also  debt 
repayment  issues  start  to  matter  as  a  country  is  expected  to  repay  her  debt  eventually. 
Therefore, there is a limit to both the stabilization possibilities and the lending capacity. 
 
3.2  Cyclical Balance 
The distinction between cyclical and structural balance was developed as a way to combine 
                                                           
9 An extreme fiscal policy approach based on Keynesian thought is the functional finance introduced by Lerner 
(1943). The aim of his functional finance is to use fiscal policy as much as possible as a function of the current 
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employment. As a result, the budget balance is only of marginal importance. Abba P. Lerner, “Functional 
Finance and the Federal Debt,” Social Research 10, no. 1 (February 1943): 39-41.   7 
the two fundamental approaches outlined above. The structural balance can be used to assess 
the  (neo)-classical  perspective  with  its  emphasis  on  long-run  sustainability  issues.  The 
cyclical  balance  can  be  used  to  assess  the  Keynesian  aspect  of  short-run  anti-cyclical 
stabilization. On the one hand, a balanced budget should be reached in the long run. On the 
other hand, a countercyclical policy is prescribed in the short run. As such, a country can run 
deficits by increasing expenditures during an economic downturn, as long as those deficits do 
not surpass the surpluses build up during the preceding economic boom. Consequently, public 
debt will remain constant in the long run.
10 However, this rule is not precluded from serious 
limitations.  As  business  cycles  are  not  symmetrical,  neither  in  length  nor  size,  over-  and 
undercompensation  can  arise.  What  is  more,  public  choice  theory  and  political  economy 
theory emphasizes that there will be insufficient downward flexibility of expenditures during 
booms due to political factors.
11 
 
3.3  Cyclically Neutral Budget Balance 
The cyclically neutral budget balance is a fiscal impulse measure developed by the German 
Council of Economic Experts.
12 The aim of this rule is not to influence the utilization rate of 
the productive capacity and keep the influence of the fiscal policy constant relative to a base 
year. Thus, the share of government spending in potential national output (valued at current 
prices) should be held constant, with potential output defined as the level of GDP in case of 
complete utilisation of the capital stock, i.e. full employment. Hence, in the long run a trend 
growth of GDP is intended, while in the short run the yearly budget balance should fit as 
closely  as  possible  that  trend.  In  particular,  a  norm  supporting  the  trend  growth  of  the 
economy at full capacity, similar to the full employment budget balance, is pursued in the 
long-term. In the short-term, on the other hand, the rule bears a resemblance to the structural 
budget rule as the actual budgetary results will be compared to a hypothetical path. 
  To  implement  the  rule,  policymakers  need  to  determine  the  future  evolution  of 
potential output, the accompanying private spending, and the desirable level of government 
expenditures for the chosen period,. In order to achieve this, a base year for which the actual 
and potential output are roughly the same is chosen. The cyclically neutral budget balance is 
then derived from the actual budget balance under the assumption that the government's tax 
proceeds  are  unit  elastic  relative  to  actual  income  and  government  expenditures  are  unit 
elastic relative to potential output. Although the assumption of a unit elastic budget is not 
quite realistic, it makes sure that the impact of automatic stabilizers is allocated to the fiscal 
impulse. For changes on the revenue side of the budget with respect to changes of the actual 
income a similar reasoning holds, regardless of the source of the change.
13 
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  Consequently, the actual budget balance
14 can be decomposed as follows: 

















g =  where Y is the actual output, Y
p is the potential output, and G  
are the government expenditures. As shown, the actual budget balance can be subdivided into 
three components: the budget balance of the base-year (the first term in the equation), the 
cyclical  component  (the  second  term),  and  the  fiscal  stance  (FIS).  The  base-year  budget 
balance and the cyclical component define the cyclically neutral budget balance. As a result, 
the equation mentioned-above can be rewritten as 
( ) FIS B FIS Y g Y t B
n p − = − − = 0 0   (7) 
The change in the fiscal stance ( FIS ∆ ) corresponds to a measure of a policy’s fiscal impulse 
(FI ). If a fiscal policy has become more expansionary with respect to the previous year, the 
fiscal  impulse  will  be  positive  in  sign,  and  vice  versa.  However,  as  the  fiscal  impulse 
represents the change in fiscal stance, the stance in any year should be laid down by the 
output in that year.
15 
  Although the cyclically neutral budget balance is a significant measure according to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and it has relatively modest data demands, it also has 
some shortcomings. Firstly, the fiscal impulse will not only include the effect of changes in 
fiscal  policy,  but  also  the  effect  of  automatic  stabilizers  as  the  actual  elasticities  are  not 
necessarily unitary. Furthermore, it will also include structural changes in the economy as the 
fiscal impulse is calculated residually. Secondly, the cyclically neutral budget balance suffers 
from the balanced budget multiplier problem. As a consequence, its neutrality is questioned as 
a  change  in  public  expenditures  is  assumed  to  have  a  larger  impact  on  output  than  an 
equivalent tax change. Finally, the method only adjusts the budget balance for deviations of 
output from its potential level. More accurately would be to include the changes in prices, 
rates of interest, and the exchange rate. The full employment budget balance presented below 
also has the latter two shortcomings.
16 
 
3.4  Full Employment Budget Balance 
To separate cyclical and structural fiscal policy, a number of alternatives were designed. In 
order  to  determine  the  full  employment  budget  balance  (FEBB)  both  revenues  and 
expenditures need to be adjusted when the actual employment deviates from full employment. 
This correction is achieved by assuming that the actual employment equals full employment 
and recalculating the matching budget balance. Losses due to lower employment need to be 
taken into account to calculate tax proceeds under the assumption of full employment. In case 
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15 Ibid, 4. 
16 Peter S. Heller, Richard D. Haas, and Ahsan S. Mansur, “A Review of the Fiscal Impulse Measure,” Occasional 
Paper No. 44 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1986): 4-5   9 
of  the  expenditures,  unemployment  benefits  need  to  be  subtracted.
17  Finally,  as  cyclical 
effects are no longer present, it is possible to determine whether the implemented policy is 
expansionary or contractionary. When the full employment deficit is increasing or the full 
employment surplus is decreasing the policy can be termed expansionary, and vice versa. In 
that way, a FEBB equal to zero is considered to be desirable as the actual stabilizing budget 
deficits will disappear when the economy revives. Nevertheless, the FEBB should not be 
confused  with  the  structural  budget  balance  from  which  one-off  events,  such  as  the 
privatization of public property, are also eliminated. Furthermore, the potential output that is 
used to separate the structural budget balance from the cyclical effects does not necessarily 
involve full employment. 
  Since tax proceeds in many European countries will increase more than the GDP due 
to progressive tax rates, the FEBB will increase in case of an economy that grows in the long 
run even though fiscal policy remains unchanged. This phenomenon is also known as fiscal 
drag.
18 The use of the FEBB as a percentage of potential GDP has been recommended to 
prevent such misinterpretation. Yet, the resulting FEBB seems to be plagued by an important 
deficit bias. Even in the absence of discretionary measures, a FEBB based policy will result in 
a fiscal expansion due to systematic optimism in growth forecasts. In practice, this would 
result in an ever increasing public debt and unsustainable public finances in the long run. A 
sufficiently  large  full  employment  budget  surplus  is  therefore  desirable.
19  Except  for  the 
uncertainty  that  accompanies  projections,  cyclical  measures  are  also  plagued  by  political 
pressure to expect an economic downturn so expenditures may rise. Furthermore, cyclical 
measures  are  characterized  by  their  lack  of  simplicity.  For  instance,  the  idealized 
circumstances necessary to calculate the FEBB are difficult to determine. Therefore, the lack 
of clarity makes departure from the rule hard to perceive.
20 
 
3.5  Structural Budget Policy 
During the 1960s and first part of the 1970s the Dutch government decided to outline and tie 
up the evolution of public finances for a few  years. Seeing that government expenditures 
continue to increase, the resulting structural budget rule remains valuable today. The rule is 
called structural because the structural deficit has to be equal to the actual budget balance in a 
base year in which full employment holds. For each subsequent year, the annual expenditure 
margin is deduced from the structural deficit and trend growth of GDP.
21  
  As the budget space for a period only encompasses the additional revenues due to 
taxation of the GDP expansion, the budget space restricts the growth of government. When 
T
Y ε  is the income elasticity of tax proceeds,  r Y &  is the estimated real trend growth of the 
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18 Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966). 
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no. 10 (10 June 2005): 1135-1137. 
20 Buchanan and Wagner. 
21 Dirk-Jan Kraan, “Cutback Management in the Netherlands,” Public Budgeting & Finance 21, no. 2 (Summer 
2001): 50-51.   10 
economy in terms of percentage, and  T  are the tax proceeds, the real budget space ( r SBS ) 
for the first year of a structural budget policy  can be calculated as follows: 
0 T Y SBS r
T
Y r ⋅ ⋅ = & ε  
(8) 
The  prior  budget  spaces  need  to  be  added  to  the  tax  revenues  during  the  base  year  to 
determine the subsequent annual budgets of that period of government. Ultimately, the budget 
space  can  be  used  to  increase  public  expenditures  or  to  lower  tax  rates.  However,  if  the 
growth  of  the  expenditures  surpasses  the  outlined  budget,  this  has  to  be  compensated  by 
underspending  in  other  years  or  alternatively  an  increase  of  the  tax  rates.  As  the  above-
mentioned real budget is corrected for inflation, it does not consider expenditure growth that 
is merely caused by inflation. A nominal budget space has to be added in case of substantial 
rates of inflation to preclude inflation from ousting other expenditures. 
  As the expansion of the public sector is limited by this fiscal rule, policymakers are 
compelled to set priorities Yet, the budget will have an automatic countercyclical effect. For 
instance, if the actual GDP growth of the economy is less than the estimated trend growth, 
then the budget will automatically result in an expansionary impulse. Since the government 
expenditures in compliance with the constraint are based on the estimated growth (as opposed 
to tax proceeds), the actual deficit will increase or the actual surplus will decrease.  
  More  recently,  two  major  changes  were  suggested.  Firstly,  the  budget  should 
henceforth  not  be  calculated  based  on  estimates,  but  rather  by  means  of  historical  data. 
Therefore, the trend growth of the economy (Y & ) and the income elasticity of tax proceeds 
(
T
Y ε ) are determined as the arithmetic mean of their values during the years prior to the base 
year. Secondly, a correction term is added to assure that the budget is in balance over the 
trend. As a result the budget space can be rewritten as follows: 
2 αD T ∆ SBS − − =   (9) 
where  ( ) Y Y T T
T
Y & & ε + = ∆ − 1 2   when  α   is  the  discretionary  constant  and  2 − D   represents  the 
budget deficit in the year t-2. The correction term of the budget deficit at the end of the base 
year is multiplied by  a  discretionary  constant (0<α <1). That way, the budget space  will 
shrink when there was a deficit during the base year and expand when there was a surplus. 
Consequently, the deficit as a percentage of GDP should tend towards zero over the trend as 
lengthy imbalances are precluded. 
  Nevertheless, some problems remain. First of all, it has been argued that the sole focus 
of fiscal policy on automatic stabilizers could be harmful as the government lacks the power 
to intervene. However, this assumption only seems to hold in case of extreme deviations as 
discretionary  measures  themselves  cause  excesses.  Secondly,  practice  has  shown  both 
arbitrary and asymmetrical implementation. Lastly, the alternative is biased due to the use of a 
discretionary  constant  and  historical  data.  Temporary  measures  may  be  included  in  the 
historical data (e.g. tax cuts), while they will not exist during the actual period of government. 
However, expectations about the future are not taken into consideration. 
 
   11 
4  Fiscal Rules in the EU: the Stability and Growth Pact and beyond 
4.1  Principles of the Stability and Growth Pact 
Despite the initiative of the European Economic Community in 1975 to devise a constraint for 
fiscal policy, it took another seventeen years until the first binding supranational fiscal rule 
was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. One of the principal goals of the Treaty 
was the formation of the European  Union.  In  addition to that other goals were  achieved, 
among which the creation of an internal economic and monetary market. The creation of the 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  of  the  European  Union  (EMU)  was  divided  in  three 
subsequent  phases.  Admission  to  the  third  and  final  phase  implied  the  introduction  of  a 
common currency unit. Member countries had to meet convergence criteria with regard to 
price stability, exchange rate stability, the long-term rate of interest, and fiscal policy to be 
admitted. The latter required the absence of excessive budget deficits. Whether a deficit is 
considered excessive or not is defined by article 104 C §2 of the Treaty and the accompanying 
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The article states that the annual budget deficit 
should not be higher than 3 percent of GDP, unless it has been on a decreasing path and by 
considerable amounts and has reached a level close to the benchmark or is of an exceptional 
and temporary nature and sufficiently close to the 3 percent benchmark. Also, total public 
debt should not be larger than 60 percent of GDP, unless it has been on a decreasing path and 
the benchmark is being approached at a satisfactory rate.
22  
  Though the convergence criteria of the Treaty of Maastricht have successfully led the 
way to the EMU, they required considerable efforts in particular if candidate countries were 
affected  by  negative  shocks  to  economic  activity.
23  Nevertheless,  the  Treaty  provided  a 
preferential treatment for some. While the benchmarks in the Treaty were criticized for being 
too strict, a loophole for highly indebted countries (i.e. Italy and Belgium) was created as an 
evolution in the direction of the benchmark was assessed to be acceptable.
24 Regardless of the 
strictness of the convergence criteria, more technical shortcomings were put forward. For 
instance,  the  benchmark  values  of  the  fiscal  rules  were  deemed  to  be  arbitrary  and 
insufficiently theoretically underpinned. The Treaty briefly referred to the mean budget deficit 
as a percentage of GDP and the mean debt as a percentage of GDP of the member states of the 
European Community in 1991, respectively 4.3 and 61.7 percent. However, there is no reason 
why these means would have been optimal for the Union as a whole, let alone for divergent 
candidate  countries.
25  Whereas  the  average  public  investments  within  the  European 
Community were equal to 3 percent of GDP during the period between 1974 and 1991, the 
golden  rule  has  also  been  associated  with  the  fiscal  benchmarks.  Nevertheless,  that 
explanation  would  not  be  sound  in  case  of  inflation.
26  Furthermore,  the  countercyclical 
possibilities under the Treaty were judged to be ambiguous if not inadequate. Deficits could 
temporarily exceed 3 percent of GDP in extraordinary circumstances. Yet, the assessment of 
circumstances as extraordinary was not always clear upfront. Therefore, measures could be 
                                                           
 
23 Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini, 75-76. 
24 Ibid, 61. 
25 Ibid, 62. 
26 Ibid, 63.   12 
delayed. However, the strict compliance with the rule during a downturn could have resulted 
in pro-cyclical effects, because expenditures need to be cut as tax proceeds automatically 
decrease. Lastly, the Treaty did not provide a contextual approach adapted to each country's 
debt level, although countries with a higher debt as a percentage of GDP pose a higher threat 
to the Union's stability. Eventually, the debt rule has been complemented by a contextual 
medium-term  rule  in  2005.  Nevertheless,  research  has  shown  that  a  budget  balance  rule 




Fiscal discipline is crucial for the well-functioning of a common currency. The unified 
money market, poses the threat that increasing deficits in one or more countries could threaten 
the stability of the Union as a whole. For instance, the borrowing due to such a deficit could 
increase  demand  in  the  unified  money  market  and  as  a  result  the  rate  of  interest  for  all 
member countries. Furthermore, some member countries feared that the European Central 
Bank would be put under pressure to mitigate the increase of the rate of interest by relaxing its 
monetary policy. This would be inconsistent with its price stability policy and damage the 
institution’s  independence.  Consequently,  the  convergence  criteria  and  Excessive  Deficit 
procedure became also the foundation of the Stability and Growth Pact as a part of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. Moreover, the Pact further concretizes the original exceptions. As well as 
natural disasters, a decline of GDP by  2 percent or more is explicitly specified to be an 
exceptional circumstance. Furthermore, when a country's GDP declines by less than 2 percent 
but more than 0,75 percent it can still be assessed exceptional by the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) of the Council of the European Union. Since the inception of the 
Pact, member countries are also compelled to submit their Stability Programs to the European 
Commission to enhance multilateral supervision.
29 Lastly, as the severe penalty of the Treaty 
of Maastricht (i.e. exclusion from the monetary union) is practically not appropriate anymore, 
a system of warnings, interest-free deposits and fines has been implemented. 
  In response to broad international criticism the Pact was revised in 2005. Firstly, the 
changes  lead  to  a  more  contextual  consideration  of  a  member  country's  circumstances. 
Henceforth, member countries with a relatively low public debt (i.e. less than 60 percent of 
GDP)  could  pursue  a  structural  deficit  of  1  percent  of  GDP  in  the  medium-term,  while 
countries with a higher debt should pursue a balanced budget or small surplus. Each year 
countries  should  move  a  half  percent  of  GDP  into  the  direction  of  their  medium-term 
objective. When economic growth is higher than projected this should be more than a half 
percent to allow reduced efforts during an economic downturn. Consequently, in the long run 
public debt as a percentage of GDP will decrease and ultimately approach zero. Secondly, 
since the revision of the Pact not only the decline of economic growth is taken into account, 
but also the duration of the economic downturn. Thirdly, the time span in which excessive 
                                                           
27 It has been argued that the insufficient contextual approach can be partially remedied by the use of the net 
public debt (i.e. the gross public debt minus the government’s financial assets). That way a country with a 
superior solvency will not be wrongfully assigned a higher debt level. Yet, empirical research has shown that 
the change to the relative positions of the EMU countries would be little. 
28 Erdem Basci, Mehmet F. Ekinci, and Murat Yulek, “On Fixed and Variable Fiscal Surplus Rules,” Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade 43, no. 3 (May-June 2007): 6. 
29 Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun, “The dog that would never bite? What we can learn from the origins of the 
Stability and Growth Pact,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 5 (October 2004): 768.   13 
deficits need to be corrected was broadened from one to two years. 
  As any fiscal rule, the Stability and Growth Pact is also plagued by shortcomings. The 
numerical values of its benchmarks remain arbitrary and are possibly counterproductive from 
the perspective of countercyclical fiscal stabilization policy. Furthermore, substantial doubt 
exists  whether  the  Pact  is  able  to  deliver  fiscal  sustainability  as  well.  The  current  fiscal 
climate has only increased this doubt as fiscal prudence appears to be slipping. One of the 
main  targets  of  criticism  concerns  the  Pact's  penalties.  Their  impact  is  only  limited  in 
comparison  to  the  threat  of  exclusion  from  the  monetary  union.  Moreover,  they  are  not 
imposed automatically, but are subject to a lengthy discretionary decision process in which 
the infringing countries take part themselves. The effectiveness of the penalties is impeded 
further as peer pressure on larger member countries is in general smaller and the threat of 
political conflicts may exist.
30 In addition, the imposition of a fine may turn out to have a pro-
cyclical  effect  and  worsen  a  country’s  situation.  A  second  aspect  of  the  criticism  is  the 
increased flexibility of the revised Pact. As a considerable series of factors need to be taken 
into consideration to judge whether a deficit is excessive, loopholes exist and judgment is 
complicated. As a result, the fiscal rule is assessed to be less transparent and simple. Thus, the 
increased flexibility also has considerable disadvantages.
31 Besides, with regard to public debt 
the Pact is clearly a step backwards in comparison to the Treaty of Maastricht as, in addition 
to the limited contextual approach, the Pact does not provide a clear penalty for infringement 
of  the  debt  benchmark.
32  Note,  however  also  that  doubt  exists  whether  a  supranational 
coordinating mechanism is in fact necessary. One may argue that international co-ordination 




4.2  Reforming the fiscal framework in the European Union 
Using also the insights on fiscal rules obtained so far, the reminder of this section sets out the 
most  important  principles  that  seem  to  emerge  from  academic  research  and  practical 
experience. The current framework of fiscal rules in the EU countries is being evaluated and 
potential reforms that could improve the efficiency and effectiveness are being considered. 
  First  of  all,  some  fundamental  requirements  need  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 
George Kopits and Steven Symansky (1998) formulated eight basic properties for an “ideal” 
fiscal  rule.
34  A  fiscal  rule  must  be  well-defined,  transparent,  simple,  flexible,  adequate, 
                                                           
30 Jakob de Haan, Helge Berger, and David-Jan Jansen, “The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?,” CESifo 
Working Paper No. 1093 (München: Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2003): 13-15; European Economic 
Advisory Group, 57. 
31 Marco Buti, “Will the New Stability and Growth Pact Succeed? An Economic and Political Perspective,” 
Economic Papers No. 241 (Brussels: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European 
Commission, 2006): 16-17; Rui H. Alves and Oscar Afonso, “The “New” Stability and Growth Pact: More 
Flexible, Less Stupid?,” Intereconomics 42, no. 4 (July 2007): 224; Antimo Verde, “The Old and the New Stability 
and Growth Pact along with the Main Proposals for Its Reform: An Assessment,” Transition Studies Review 13, 
no. 3 (October 2006): 484; Verde, 493. 
32 de Haan, Berger, and Jansen, 13. 
33 Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini, 82. 
34 Willem H. Buiter also formulated such requirements specifically for the EMU. See Willem H. Buiter, “Ten 
Commandments for a Fiscal Rule in the E(M)U,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19, no. 1 (2003).   14 
enforceable,  consistent,  and  efficient.
35  However,  as  public  budgeting  and  finance  is  an 
economic matter, some specific economic requirements are also necessary to enhance a rule's 
effectiveness.  Therefore,  we  have  deducted  the  following  conclusions  from  the  above-
mentioned rules and their shortcomings: 
•  A relative measure to preclude fiscal drag is advisable. In addition to that, a relative 
measure will also improve a fiscal rule's effectiveness by facilitating comparison over 
time as well as between countries. 
•  Comparability  is  enhanced  when  there  is  a  correction  for  inflation.  Although  the 
formation of the EMU restricts the consequences of inflation, it would be improper not 
to  adjust  the  rule  to  consider  inflation.  Otherwise,  the  necessary  measures  will  be 
overestimated.
36 
•  A budgetary constraint should not only refer to the balance to avoid potential adverse 
effects  on  the  underlying  components  of  the  budget  balance  (e.g.,  undesirable  tax 
increases  to  compensate  for  structural  problems  on  the  expenditure  side  of  the 
balance). Therefore, government expenditures and revenues also need to be included 
in the design of fiscal discipline.
37 
•  Effectiveness will also be enhanced when the rule supports a medium term (instead of 
a  short  term)  approach.  That  way,  policymakers  are  compelled  to  pursue  a  more 
sustainable fiscal policy since the future consequences of short term measures must be 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, possible manipulation concerning the timing of 
expenses and revenues in order to change the stock and/or composition of government 
debt  over  time  is  discouraged.  Moreover,  fiscal  policy  becomes  more  predictable 
which enhances public confidence. However, a budget window that is too long will 
contain  periods  for  which  current  measures  do  not  matter.  As  a  result,  the 
policymakers'  focus  on  periods  that  do  matter  would  decrease  and  the  constraint's 
effectiveness would be diminished.
38 
•  Since the standard budget balance is insufficient to assess the stance of fiscal policy, 
taking into consideration cyclical effects seems appropriate. By enriching the fiscal 
disciplinary system like that, the actual policy can be assessed objectively irrespective 
of automatic stabilizers. However, the allowed degree of stabilization policy depends 
on the actual fiscal rule. 
  This overview shows that there are serious shortcomings in the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Therefore, numerous adaptations of the Pact have been proposed. Some include the 
simple  proposal  of  a  well-known  approach,  such  as  the  golden  rule  or  the  adoption  of  a 
                                                           
35 George Kopitz and Steven Symansky, “Fiscal Policy Rules,” Occasional Paper No. 162 (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1998): 18-19. 
36 Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini, 74; Vito Tanzi, Mario I. Blejer, and Mario O. Teijeiro, “Effects of Inflation on 
Measurement of Fiscal Deficits: Conventional Versus Operational Measures,” in How To Measure the Fiscal 
Deficit, eds. M.I. Blejer and A. Cheasty (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1993), 175-204. 
37 This requirement is also underpinned by authors who claim that fiscal constraints with respect to the growth 
rate of public expenditures are the most cost-effective. See Michael U. Dothan and Fred Thompson, “A better 
budget rule,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 28, no.3 (Summer 2009). 
38 Alan J. Auerbach, “Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal control,” Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 1-2 
(January 2006): 88.   15 
cyclically adjusted budget balance rule. Others present a more complex adjustment of the 
Pact, such as the trail-blazing system of tradable deficit permits.
39 According to the economic 
requirements formulated above, the Pact's effectiveness remains doubtful. The Pact contains 
relative  measures  for  the  budget  deficit  and  the  public  debt.  Furthermore,  it  is  a  more 
medium-term oriented approach and incorporates a structural measure. However, nothing has 
been laid down with respect to the cyclical portion of the budget balance. Moreover, the Pact 
does not pay attention to the underlying parts of the budget balance, nor does it take into 
consideration the rate of inflation. The necessity of reform is further emphasized when the 
Pact is assessed according to the fundamental requirements of an ideal fiscal rule. Although 
its simplicity has been widely acknowledged, the enforceability of the Pact seemed to be the 
principal problem both before and after the 2005 reform.
40 This is in accordance with the 
above-mentioned lack of sufficient and effective penalties. 
  As a result, member countries of the European Union are employing and prolonging 
the application of domestic alternative rules. One may argue that this is simply to comply with 
the fiscal rules of the Pact. However, it seems more appropriate to conclude that the domestic 
rules are a means to achieve a more prudent fiscal policy given the shortcomings of the Pact 
and  the  stringent  nature  of  those  domestic  rules.  The  abundance  and  stringency  of  the 
complementary rules is illustrated by the data that are compiled below. The data are based on 
the results of two rounds of surveys conducted by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European Commission in 2006 and 2008 in order to 
map out the fiscal governance in EU member states. The questionnaires of these surveys 
requested information on the description and definition of the fiscal rules and their coverage, 
their statutory  base, monitoring and  enforcement mechanisms, as well as experience with 
respect to the rules directly from the EU Member States.
41 
 






Rule  Revenue Rule  Debt Rule 
Austria  1          
Belgium  3  1       
Bulgaria     1     1 
Cyprus             
Czech Republic     1       
Germany  3  1     1 
Denmark  1  1  1    
Estonia  1        1 
Greece             
                                                           
39 Jonas Fischer, Lars Jonung, and Martin Larch, “101 Proposals to reform the Stability and Growth Pact. Why so 
many? A survey,” Economic Papers No. 267 (Brussels: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
European Commission, 2006): 4-21. 
40 Alves and Afonso, 221-224; Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger, and Daniele Franco, “Revisiting EMU's Stability 
Pact: A Pragmatic Way Forward,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19, no.1 (March 2003): 100-111; Jérôme 
Creel, “Ranking Fiscal Policy Rules: the Golden Rule of Public Finance versus the Stability and Growth Pact,” 
Documents de Travail de l'OFCE No. 2003-2004 (Paris: Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques, 
2003): 3-12. 
41 The original data are made publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_ 
governance/documents/1-db_fiscal_rules_en.xls   16 
Spain  2        3 
Finland  2  1  1    
France  1  2  1  1 
Hungary  1        1 
Ireland  1  2       
Italy  2  2       
Lithuania  1  1  1  1 
Luxembourg  1  1     1 
Latvia        1  1 
Malta             
Netherlands     1  1    
Poland           1 
Portugal  2        2 
Romania  1        1 
Sweden  2  1       
Slovenia           2 
Slovakia     1     1 
United Kingdom  1        1 
Total  26  17  6  19 
Source: Based on own calculations from data from DG for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission 
 
A full description of each individual fiscal rule is included in Appendix A. For instance, 
Estonia and Portugal apply a balanced budget rule. Some member states apply more stringent 
rules than the Pact. For example, the neo-classical golden rule applies in the United Kingdom 
and  Germany,  Denmark  targets  strict  structural  surpluses,  and  Spain  expects  its  general 
government to reach a budget surplus of 1 percent of GDP over the business cycle. Only three 
countries had not introduced their own fiscal rules when the survey was last conducted in 
2008  (i.e.  Cyprus,  Greece,  and  Malta).  Furthermore,  Table  1  shows  that  the  amount  of 
domestic fiscal rules has increased since 2006. 
  The Stability and Growth Pact has established supranational directives with regard to 
fiscal policy. Yet, member countries maintain a lot of freedom in achieving them. The data 
show that this eventually leads to a broad set of different domestic rules. Furthermore, those 
numerous rules prove to be not all effective.
42 In addition, most lack independent monitoring 
and have poor enforcement mechanisms in case of non-compliance. It is clear that uniformity 
is missing with regard to fiscal policy rules in the EU. 
  As a consequence, policymakers are facing a dilemma. On the one hand, the Pact 
seems to be insufficient to reach its economic objectives, establish uniformity, and could seem 
rather  redundant  considering  the  numerous  (more  stringent)  domestic  rules.  On  the  other 
hand, a large portion of those domestic rules is not effective enough to devolve all fiscal 
power on member states. There are several possibilities to solve this problem. A first possible 
solution would be to use the current structure of simple supranational rules complemented by 
domestic rules to reach the most desirable fiscal policy. For instance, it could be made the 
responsibility of the member states to regulate the revenues and expenditures underlying the 
                                                           
42 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Commission, “Public finances in EMU – 
2009,” European Economy No. 5 (Brussels: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European 
Commission, 2009): 89-93.   17 
budget balance. However, as mentioned above, there exists a large difference between the 
effectiveness  of  the  currently  implemented  domestic  fiscal  rules.  Therefore,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  co-ordinate  the  national  responsibilities.  For  example,  supranational 
policymakers  could  use  the  above-mentioned  requirements  as  guidelines  for  the  rules 
implemented by member states’ authorities. 
A second solution would be to profoundly reform the Pact once again. As mentioned 
above there have been an innumerable amount of proposals to revamp the Pact. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to agree upon the most appropriate reform that would remedy the Pact’s 
shortcomings. For example, there exist both advocates and opponents of more supervision of 
the national fiscal policy by independent economic committees or institutions. Moreover, an 
unanimous  decision  of  the  member  states  would  be  necessary  as  a  reform  requires  the 
alteration of the regulation of the Council of the European Union. Consequently, this solution 
seems fairly unlikely to occur, although it would enhance the European uniformity and make 
domestic fiscal rules superfluous.  
 
5  Effects of fiscal rules on the fiscal stance in the Euro Area: empirical evidence 
5.1  Overview of fiscal positions and fiscal rules in the euro area 
Just as countries differ in their national fiscal rules, they differ in their fiscal positions and 
fiscal adjustments over time. To obtain an overview on the average fiscal position and the 
development  over  time,  Figure  1,  plots  a  number  of  relevant  variables  for  the  euro  area 
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Figure 1: Fiscal adjustment, euro area aggregate, 1995-2010.  
Source: calculations with Eurostat and EU Commission data. 
 
During the period 1999-2007, the euro area as whole essentially managed to satisfy the 3% 
norm for the total deficit. Also debt dynamics must be considered sustainable, helped also by 
a generally favourable business cycle and interest rates. Due to the financial crisis that started 
in 2008 and the protracted economic slowdown that follows –witnessed in the negative output 
gap-, fiscal balance have become much less favourable recently. The fiscal impulse, which is 
defined as the first difference of the structural balance, increases sharply reflecting the fiscal   18 
stimulus package that have been adopted to counteract the effects from the financial crisis. 
The primary fiscal balance gap, which measures the difference between the current primary 
balance and the primary balance that would stabilize government debt at its current level, 
turns sharply negative, suggesting that fiscal sustainability is under stress. 
  These  aggregate  euro  area  fiscal  dynamics  are  seen  also  in  the  individual  country 
fiscal variables, even if in some cases more pronounced than others. One reason could of 
course be that course are not all hit to the same degree by the financial crisis. Another reason 
could be that countries differ in initial fiscal positions and the degree to which their fiscal 
rules are effective in restricting fiscal balances.  
  To  capture  the  influence  of  the  institutional  features  that  foster  the  effective 
implementation of fiscal rules, DG ECFIN has constructed indexes of strength of fiscal rules, 
using information on (i) the statutory base of the rule, (ii) the body in charge of monitoring 
the  respect  of  the  rule,  (iii)  the  body  in  charge  of  enforcement  of  the  rule,  and  (iv)  the 
enforcement mechanisms relating to the rule. Based on the strength index for each rule, a 
comprehensive time-varying Fiscal Rule Index (FRI) for each Member State was constructed. 
This FRI is calculated by summing up all fiscal rule strength indices in force in the respective 
Member State, weighted by the coverage of general government finances by the respective 
rule (to into account that e.g. a fiscal rule that applies to a local or regional government may 
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Figure 2: Fiscal Rules Index, Euro Area 1995-2008. Source: European Commision. 
 
Countries in the euro area continue to display considerable variation in the characteristics of 
their fiscal rules, possibly more than one would expect in a common currency area. Over time, 
a  small  increase  in  the  euro  area  average  fiscal  rule  index  is  observed,  suggesting  an 
increasing importance of the fiscal rules in the euro area fiscal management. An interesting 
use of the fiscal rule index could be set as a benchmark/target for the domestic rules. Rules 
scoring low/not meeting requirements at all should be improved in their effectiveness during   19 
the next periods. The advantage of such an approach seems obvious. National policymakers 
would maintain the freedom to design a fiscal policy that is effective on the one hand and 
suits  national  circumstances  and  preferences  on  the  other  hand.  However,  European 
uniformity as well as possible undesirable effects of one country’s policy on another member 
state would be partially overlooked. 
 
5.2  Effects of fiscal rules: panel estimations for the euro area 
To analyse the effects of fiscal rules on the fiscal stance, we estimated panel-regressions for 
the 16 euro area countries for the period 1995-2008. We estimate the impact of the fiscal rule 
index on (1) the fiscal balance, (2) the primary fiscal balance, (3) government spending, (4) 
government revenue, (5) the structural primary balance, (6) the cyclical fiscal balance (7) the 
fiscal impulse, (8) the primary fiscal balance gap.  
  To do so, we add the Fiscal Rule Index to otherwise fairly standard estimations of 
eight different budgetary reaction functions that include the lagged dependent variable, the 
output gap, and the debt level. This approach enables to consider the essence of both the 
classical and the Keynesian aspects of fiscal policy rules as outlined in Section 2 and 3. The 
presence of the output gap reflects the importance of cyclical factors in fiscal variables, the 
presence of the debt level the impact from fiscal sustainability considerations. We include a 
constant and/or trend if they improve the estimation results further. Country-specific fixed or 
random effects were included in some case but are not reported. 
 
Table 2: Panel estimation of the effects on fiscal rules on fiscal stance 
Dependent 
variable 






































                 






















































































Time trend  -  -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
             20 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.65  0.59  0.95  0.97  0.68  0.74  0.13  0.17 
S.E. 
regression 
1.70  1.67  1.36  0.99  1.57  0.44  1.62  3.00 
Log 
likelihood 
-384.38  -366.17  -332.7950  -262.34  -365.83  -122.24  -389.35  -403.47 
Durbin 
Watson 




-1.42  1.68  44.84  43.39  1.32  0.20  0.12  0.35 
No. Obs.  198  191  198  198  197  206  206  161 
 
Notes: ***: significant at a 1% level. **: significant at a 5% level. *: significant at the 10% level.  
a Net lending /Net borrowing (-) as a % of GDP under the Excessive Deficit Procedure, source Eurostat. 
b Primary fiscal balance as a % of GDP, source Eurostat. 
c Total general government expenditure as a % of GDP, source Eurostat 
d Total general government revenue as a % of GDP, source Eurostat 
e Structural primary fiscal balance as a % of GDP, source: European Commission data. 
f Source: European Commission data 
g Fiscal impuls =  -∆ (structural primary balance/GDP). 
h Source: own calculations 
i Source: European Commission data 
j General government consolidated gross debt as a % of GDP, source Eurostat 
k Fiscal Rules Index compiled by the EU Commission. 
 
The regression results in most cases confirm the existing literature: the effects of the output 
gap  and  lagged  debt  on  the  fiscal  variables  are  similar  to  those  found in  other  empirical 
estimations of fiscal balance equations (see e.g. Claeys (2008) and Ballabriga and Martinez-
Mongay (2003))
43. An increase in debt contributes to a lower total balance (column (1)) -
reflecting the interest burden- but also to a higher primary balance -reflecting a stabilizing 
mechanism as a high debt level increases the (perceived) need to improve the primary fiscal 
balance. The Fiscal Rules Index has in most cases a significant positive effect on the fiscal 
balance (both on the total fiscal balance and the primary fiscal balance (column (2)). This 
suggests that fiscal rules have had a deficit reducing effect and are in that sense important for 
the workings of fiscal policy in the euro area: stronger fiscal rules in a country and over time 
contribute  to  a  lower  deficit.  Fiscal  rules  tend  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  government 
spending (column (3)), while no significant effect on government revenues (column (4)). 
  In  column  (5),  the  reaction  function  for  the  structural  primary  fiscal  balance  is 
estimated,  a  measure  that  is  closely  linked  to  the  fiscal  stance  and  to  the  long-run  fiscal 
sustainability. It is found that a stronger Fiscal Rule Index improves the structural primary 
fiscal balance, a finding that confirms the results of the European Commission (2010) for the 
sample of all EU countries.
44 A higher debt level also increases the structural primary fiscal 
                                                           
43 Claeys, P. (2008), Rules, and their effects on fiscal policy in Sweden, Swedish economic policy review, 15, p.7-
47. Ballabriga F, Martinez-Mongay, C., (2003), Has EMU shifted monetary and fiscal policies? In: Buti, M. (ed) 
Monetary and fiscal policies in EMU: interactions and coordination. Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge 
44 See European Commission (2010), Public Finances in EMU 2009. We also estimated (1)-(8) for the entire 
sample of EU countries. In that case, results are in several cases consistent with Table 2.   21 
balance  indicating  -as  in  column  (2)-  a  stabilizing  effect  from  high  debt  on  the  primary 
structural deficit. An increase in the output gap reduces the structural primary fiscal balance 
suggesting  some  pro-cyclicality  in  this  discretionary  part  of  the  fiscal  balance.  In  the 
literature, some studies find pro-cyclicality in the structural primary balance, while in others 
evidence for the more desirable property of anti-cyclicality is found. In the estimation for the 
cyclical fiscal balance, column (7), the output gap plays an import role, reflecting the role of 
automatic stabilizers; the Fiscal Rule Index does not seem to have an effect on the cyclical 
deficit. Column (8) displays the estimation results for the fiscal rule for the fiscal impulse. An 
increase of the output gap increases the fiscal impulse, implying again a pro-cyclical bias in 
discretionary fiscal policy. A higher fiscal rule index may reduce somewhat the fiscal impulse 
even if the coefficient is not estimated precisely.  
  To estimate the effect of the fiscal rules on the fiscal balance more specifically, we can 
also use the regression results in a more precise manner: if we put the coefficient on the fiscal 
rule index to zero in the estimated fiscal balance equation estimated in column (1) of Table 2, 
we would obtain an estimate of the fiscal balance in case there would not be any effect from 
fiscal rules on fiscal discipline and therefore on fiscal balances. 
  Figure 2 gives for the case of Belgium, and the estimated impact of fiscal rules on the 
fiscal balance as the difference between FBAL_BE_1 (blue line, deficit if no effect fiscal 
rules) and FBAL_BE_2 (red line, deficit with effect fiscal rules according panel estimation 
(1)). As one sees, the estimated impact of fiscal rules is not negligible. We can take the 
analysis even one step further by re-estimating panel estimation (1) and allowing country-
specific slope coefficients for the fiscal rule index variable. In that case we allow for the 
possibility that countries differ in the way fiscal rules impact on fiscal variables; in the panel 
estimations  earlier  such  country-specific  elasticities  for  the  Fiscal  Rules  Index  were  not 
considered. In the case of Belgium, this increases even further the estimated effect of fiscal 
rules,  FBAL_BE_2  vs  FBAL_BE_3  (green  line,  deficit  with  effect  fiscal  rules  according 
panel estimation with country-specific FRI-slopes): the estimated  coefficient is more than 
double in size as the original panel estimation that assumes equal slopes across the euro area 
countries. In the case of Belgium, the estimated difference is the largest of all countries. In 
other countries the difference with the first panel estimation without country-specific slopes is 
smaller. According to this estimation, the deficit moderating effect of fiscal rules can improve 
the fiscal balance by as much as 1%.  
  In a similar vein, we find in case of Austria that the effect of the fiscal rules is much 
smaller. In the case of Spain the effect of fiscal rules on the fiscal deficit is initially also small, 
but increases consistently over time. Also in the case of the Netherlands, the fiscal rules have 
some  impact  on  moderating  fiscal  deficits  and  in  this  case  there  is  no  distinguishable 
difference  between  the  panel  estimation  without  and  the  estimation  with  country-specific 
slopes on the fiscal rules index. In the case of Germany, the effect of the fiscal rules index 
disappears in the panel regression with country-specific slopes on this variable. Greece forms 
a special case in the sense that its fiscal rule index reached the lowest (and negative) score of 
all countries. Given a positive coefficient in the panel estimation without and with country-
specific slope on the FRI, this would imply that fiscal rules in the case of Greece actually 
contribute to a lower fiscal balance (higher fiscal deficit if one likes). Or more provocative: a 
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Figure 3: Estimated effects of fiscal rules: Belgium (BE), Austria (AT), Spain (ES), the Netherlands (NL), 
Germany (DE) and Greece (EL). 
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  Taken together, these findings suggest that fiscal rules exert a non-negligible effect on 
fiscal balances in the euro area, even if the effects may have differed somewhat between 
countries  and  over  time  reflecting  the  idiosyncrasies  in  macroeconomic  conditions,  fiscal 
management and regulatory frameworks of the individual countries. 
 
6  Conclusion 
Although the amount of proposals of fiscal rules is extensive, the most significant fiscal rules 
that have been proposed and implemented, were briefly discussed in this paper. At the base of 
those rules is the decades-old contrast between a Keynesian stabilization policy  requiring 
deficit  spending  and  the  more  prudent  (neo)classical  approach.  Some  fiscal  rules  tried  to 
reconcile both lines of thought (e.g. the cyclical balance and the structural budget policy). 
Others arose from their extremes (e.g. the functional finance). As learning form the past is a 
preparation for the future, the shortcomings of each fiscal rule were clearly presented in our 
overview.  Finally,  we  can  conclude  from  the  overview  that  no  fiscal  rule  is  without 
shortcomings. 
  In  addition  to  the  fundamental  requirements  presented  by  Kopits  and  Symansky 
(1998), we also deducted requirements for an effective fiscal rule from the previous analysis. 
The  presented  economic  requirements  make  up  a  framework  for  the  future  on  which 
researchers  and  policymakers  can  base  their  decisions.  The  framework  consists  of  the 
following five requirements: a fiscal rule should (1) comprise a relative measure, (2) correct 
for inflation, (3) refer to the underlying components of the budget balance, (4) embrace a 
medium term approach, and (5) take into account the stance of fiscal policy. 
  As the Stability and Growth Pact does not achieve satisfactory results in practice and 
in  comparison  to  the  handful  of  requirements  provided,  many  European  countries  are 
implementing and prolonging the application of (sub)national alternatives (i.e. domestic fiscal 
rules). However policymakers are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the Pact seems to 
be insufficient and rather redundant considering the numerous domestic rules. On the other 
hand, a large portion of those domestic rules is not effective enough to devolve all fiscal 
power  on  member  states.  Nevertheless,  since  change  is  perceived  necessary  and  another 
reform of the Pact improbable in the short run, the only solution to the problem is to maintain 
the  Pact’s  fiscal  constraints,  but  to  complement  them  with  better  co-ordinated  national 
responsibilities. 
  Our empirical estimates indicate that the existing framework of fiscal rules in the euro 
area –notwithstanding the inconsistencies in design, implementation and enforcement- did 
exert a non-negligible effect on fiscal balances in the euro area, even if the effects may have 
differed  somewhat  between  countries  and  over  time  reflecting  the  idiosyncrasies  in  the 
macroeconomic conditions, fiscal management and regulatory frameworks of the individual 
countries.   24 
Appendix A Description domestic fiscal policy rule in effect 2008 
Country   Description  Type 
AT   * Budget balance as % of GDP: Deficit targets for the CG, RG, and LG contained in a National Stability Pact 
within a multiannual budgetary setting.  BBR 
BE   * Balanced budget rule for LG: mandatory balance of budgetary accounts.  
* Regional governments must register a surplus or, at least, a balanced budget by 2010 at latest. 
* Balanced budget rule for SS sector. 
BBR 
   * Real growth of health care expenditure must be equal or lower than a pre-established figure.  ER 
BG   * Ceiling on the size of the government sector: 40% of GDP.  ER 
   * Outstanding portion of the consolidated government debt at the end of each year may not exceed the 
previous year, as a ratio to the projected GDP.  DR 
CY,MT,EL  * No information     
CZ   * Inserted in a medium term expenditure framework (MTEF), covers 2 years beyond the budget year. 
Expenditure limits are set to achieve a pre-defined deficit target.   ER 
DE   * Golden rule: public borrowing is only allowed if it does not exceed public investment. Exceptions allowed 
for stabilisation purposes only. 
* Balanced budget rule for LG ('administrative' and capital accounts). 
* Golden rule: the credit volume must not exceed the investment volume, except for dealing with adverse 
macroeconomic developments. 
BBR 
   * Until a balanced structural budget is reached, the growth rate of expenditures must be lower than the growth 
rate of overall revenues.  ER 
   * Raising credits by the communes requires authorisation by the supervisory agencies and must only be used 
to finance investments. Numerical limits and ceilings.  DR 
DK   * Structural budget surpluses in the interval 0.75 - 1.75% of GDP in the years towards 2010, surpluses or at 
least balance up to 2011-2015.  BBR 
   * Real public consumption on a national account basis must not increase by more than certain amounts per 
year. Besides, total ceiling of 26.5% of cyclically adjusted GDP in 2015.  ER 
   * Direct and indirect taxes cannot be raised.  RR 
EE   * Balanced budget rule for GG.  BBR 
   * Limited issuance of new debt: (1) From 2004 the debt ceiling is 60%. (2) From 1994: annual repayment 
must not exceed 20% of budgeted revenues.  DR 
ES  * The budgetary objectives take into account the economy's cyclical position, allowing budget deficits in 
periods of slow growth but requiring surpluses in periods of high growth. The overall deficit during 
downturns must not exceed 1% of GDP. In addition, a deficit of up to 0,5% of GDP is allowed to finance 
public investment under certain conditions. 
* LG must register a balanced budget or a surplus. 
BBR 
   * Total LG debt cannot exceed 110% of current revenues and must register positive savings. 
* Restrictions on possible loans. 
* For each RG, indebtedness must be the same (nominal terms) at the beginning and at the end of each year. 
DR 
FI   * Target of structural surplus of 1% by the end of the parliamentary term. Cyclical or other short-term 
deviations allowed, if they do not jeopardise the reduction of the CG debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed 
2,5% of total output. 
* Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets in balance. Contains provisions 
on budget and financial plans, financial statements, reporting on operations, and financial supervision. 
BBR 
   * At the beginning of the electoral period, CG sets a ceiling for expenditure over this period.  ER 
   * Counter-cyclical regulation of unemployment security contributions and earnings-related pension 
contributions using so-called EMU-buffer funds that exist in the unemployment insurance fund in the private 
sector pension scheme. 
RR 
FR  * Golden rule: voted budgets must be in balance; ex post deficits cannot exceed 5% of current revenues (10% 
for small municipalities).  BBR 
   * Targeted increase of CG expenditure in real terms. 
* Annual vote of the NP on the national ceiling for health expenditure in terms of volume.   ER 
   * CG to define the allocation of higher than expected tax revenues ex ante.  RR 
   * Each increase in the SS debt has to be matched by an increase in revenues. Thus, the repayment of the SS 
debt should not be prolonged.  DR 
HU  * Government presents a budget bill to the NP that ensures the primary balance, in the Maastricht sense, 
being in surplus.  BBR 
   * The annual ceiling of the debt-creating commitments of LG (borrowing and related charges, bond issues, 
etc.) is set in proportion to the capacity to repay debt.  DR 
IE   * For any given year, LG must have a net total deficit of no more than a fixed nominal amount. In addition, 
the Health Service Executive, which is part of CG, is prohibited from borrowing or running a deficit.  BBR 
   * 1% of GNP is set aside from government expenditure and automatically paid into the National Pension 
Reserve Fund for investment on behalf of the State. 
* Rolling 5-year multi-annual capital envelopes set out capital investment by Ministerial Group for each year 
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in the 5 year period. The envelopes are based on a commitment to keep capital investment around 5% of 
GNP. 
IT   * According to article no. 119 of Italian constitution, Local and Regional bodies are allowed to carry on 
deficit only for financing investments. 
* Healthcare pact. Agreement to regulate transfers from government to regions to finance the National Health 
Care System. The level of the transfers is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. 
BBR 
   * Expenditure ceiling for pharmaceutical products: 16.4% (14% territorial, 2.4% hospital) of the financing 
level for the National Health Service contributed by the State. 
* Internal Stability Pact provides LG with measures to limit expenditure. Expenditure evolution depends on 
kind of entities (regions, municipalities, provinces) and year to which it refers.  
ER 
LT   * LG must approve balanced budgets.  BBR 
   * If the GG budgets showed a deficit on average over the past 5 calendar years, then the annual growth rate of 
the planned State budget appropriations may not exceed 0,5% of the average growth rate of the State budget 
revenue of those 5 years.  
ER 
   * The deficit of the approved State budget shall be reduced by excess revenue of the current year.  RR 
   * Limits set on CG net borrowing.  DR 
LU   * Annual budget balance rule with constitution of reserve funds for healthcare, long-term healthcare and 
pension private sector schemes.  BBR 
   * In the course of the legislative period, public expenditure growth is maintained at a rate compatible with the 
medium term economic growth prospects (no formal quantified target, but implicit).  ER 
   * CG maintains public debt at a low level. New public debt can be issued to finance rail infrastructure 
projects. No formal quantified target, but implicit.  DR 
LV   * The CG and SS budgets are divided into base and special budgets. The latter must be fully financed by 
earmarked revenues. Special budgets are devoted to social needs, mainly pension payments.  RR 
   * LG can only increase borrowing and loan guaranties up to certain limits set by CG.  DR 
NL   * Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be compensated within the sector; windfalls have first to 
be used to compensate for setbacks within that sector. Windfalls can be used for new expenditure as long as 
total expenditure is below the ceiling.  
ER 
   * At the beginning of the electoral period, coalition agrees on the desired development of the tax base. This 
multi-year path is adhered to during the period. Additional tax increases are compensated through tax relief 
and vice versa. Only changes in statutory tariffs are taken into account. Increases in the tax income due to 
economic developments are not considered. The rule obliges the government to preallocate higher than 
expected revenues.  
RR 
PL   * Public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. If the debt exceeds 60% of GDP any government borrowing is 
forbidden in the subsequent year, which means that public accounts should be in balance or surplus.  DR 
PT   * Budgets of services with financial and administrative autonomy must be in balance or positive. 
* The target is a nominal budget balance.   BBR 
   * Net indebtedness for LG capped at 125% of previous year's revenues, a ceiling for medium and long term 
loans (100%) and short-term loans (10%). Net debt growth ceiling for LG capped at 0%. 
* Net indebtedness ceilings for autonomous RG are defined annually in the State budget. 
DR 
RO   * Budget balance rule for LG.  BBR 
   * LG cannot contract or guarantee loans if their annual public debt service (principal payment, interest, 
commissions) including the loan they want to contract, is higher than 30% of their own revenue.  DR 
SE  * Local Government Act: LG are obliged to balance their budgets. 
* A surplus for the GG in terms of 1% of GDP over the cycle targeted.   BBR 
   * Nominal expenditure ceiling for CG and extra-budgetary old-age pension system targeted.  ER 
SI   * The debt/GDP ratio of GG and non-financial public entities (classified outside GG) cannot exceed 40% of 
GDP. 
* The total payment of principal and interest in each year must not exceed 8% of revenues of the previous 
year. LG cannot borrow abroad. Any LG borrowing needs approval of the ministry of finance. 
DR 
SK   * Expenditure not considered in the State budget law can only be executed if its total amount does not exceed 
1% of total expenditure approved in the budget law and the deficit is not increased. Allows increasing 
expenditure in good times. Initially, the rule set a limit of 15%.  
ER 
   * Borrowing limits for RG and LG: (1) Total debt cannot exceed 60% of current revenue in the previous 
budget year in nominal terms (i.e. capital revenues and revenues from financial transactions are excluded). (2) 
Annual instalments to reimburse debt cannot exceed 25 % of revenue in the previous budget year in nominal 
terms. 
DR 
UK   * Golden rule: GG borrowing only allowed for investment, not to fund current spending. Performance against 
the rule is measured by the average surplus on the current budget as % of GDP over the economic cycle.   BBR 
   * Sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held at a stable and 
prudent level over the economic cycle. Other things equal, net debt will be maintained below 40% of GDP 
over the economic cycle. 
DR 
Note: BBR: Budget balance rule, ER: Expenditure rule, RR: Revenue rule, DR: Debt rule, GG: General government 
(includes CG, RG, LG, and SS), CG: Central government, RG: Regional government, LG: Local government, SS: Social 
security, NP: National parliament  
Source: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission 